By Malou Mangahas
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism
Second of Three Parts
Eight years ago in 2003, the PCIJ had exposed how the soldiers themselves were arming the enemy, by selling bullets and guns at fat discounts to rebels. To make matters worse, the transactions transpired at the very heart of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) command: the General Headquarters at Camp Aguinaldo.
That early, a New People’s Army (NPA) cadre code-named Ricky visited Aguinaldo on and off to purchase wares of war from soldiers. The bullets went for P5 a pop, even though the government at the time spent P14 to make or purchase each one.
The sale of guns and bullets by some soldiers to rebel groups and warlords is an old cottage industry, according to contacts from the NPA and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Then and now, government arsenals have become a dipping pond for rebel groups, thanks to soldiers given to making quick money.
More stories on anomalies in the military would follow, by the PCIJ and other media outfits. Talks about reforming the AFP would inevitably spring up after every story. Yet as the recent hearings on corruption in the AFP at the Senate have shown, such talk has resulted in little action.
Clearly, people and paper combine to affirm with certitude that corruption – petty, big, and bureaucratic – unfolds with impunity, and has become massive and routine in the AFP. The stories that officers and men tell are validated in audit reports and official documents filed from years ago. More than ample testimonial and documentary proof of corruption in the AFP exists. Yet it seems like officials investigating the issue simply do not know where to look, or just do not want to know.
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A politicized military By Jaemark Tordecilla In a way, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s Cabinet toward the end of her regime could be described as “star-studded.” Arroyo, after all, had a habit of appointing retired star-rank generals to key positions in her official family. Former Armed Forces of the Philippines AFP) vice chief of staff Eduardo Ermita served as executive secretary. Angelo Reyes and Hermogenes Esperon Jr., both former AFP chiefs of staff, handled several portfolios, while former Philippine National Police director generals Leandro Mendoza and Hermogenes Ebdane were appointed transportation secretary and public works secretary, respectively. Retired officers peppered the rest of the Arroyo administration as well. Alexander Yano, Roy Cimatu, and Generoso Senga parlayed their stints as AFP head into diplomatic posts; Dionisio Santiago led the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency after retirement; and former PNP chiefs Avelino Razon, and Arturo Lomibao also held key government positions. The presence of these generals in government, critics said, was a sign of just how politicized the military had become under PGMA. The appointments, they added, were simply a way for the government to reward allies who have remained loyal to the president. The Arroyo administration, for its part, tried to justify the appointments of retired military and police officers by touting their qualification and competence. Harder to justify, however, is the revolving door policy for appointing military chiefs. In her nine years in office, Arroyo appointed a total of 12 generals as AFP Chief of Staff: Reyes, Diomedio Villanueva, Cimatu, Benjamin Defensor, Santiago, Narciso Abaya, Efren Abu, Senga, Esperon, Yano, Victor Ibrado, and Delfin Bangit. Setting aside Reyes – actually a hold-over from the Estrada regime – seven of these men held the post for less than a year, with Defensor barely having enough time to have a cup of coffee as chief, serving only a total of 69 days. Critics hit the policy, noting how the flux of leaders prevented the armed forces from pursuing much-need reforms. Many also viewed the tactic as an act of political pandering for favored generals by a government faced with questions of legitimacy after the ‘Hello, Garci’ scandal. With the military having been part of two popular revolts that ousted incumbent presidents, it paid for Arroyo to have the generals on her side. And with recent reports of AFP chiefs receiving multi-million peso going-away packages, it looks like it certainly paid for generals to receive Arroyo’s blessing for the post – if only for a few months. “That quickly became the game in the AFP, to get to the top so you can get your pabaon,” says retired general Ricardo C. Morales, a fierce advocate of reforms in the Armed Forces. To be sure though, the entry of military officers into politics began long before Arroyo took power. During the early Martial Law years, several military officers were also in civilian posts, with some even going into local government. And far from having a diminishing political role in after EDSA, the military has only steadily grown as an actor in the country’s political equation. “The military, once it intervenes, cannot go back to the barracks,” Gregorio Honasan, a leader of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement that was behind several coup d’état attempts in the late ‘80s, told the PCIJ in a 2006 interview. It is quite ironic to see soldiers who have spent a good part of their careers battling Maoist insurgents prove true the old Mao Zedong maxim that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” But the door to political power for military officials has also come through the ballot instead of arms. Three of Corazon Aquino’s military chiefs used the position as a springboard for their political careers; Fidel Ramos went all the way to the top as president, Rodolfo Biazon served as senator for 15 years and is now on his first term as a representative, and Renato de Villa tried to duplicate his mentor Ramos’s feat by running for the country’s highest office in 1998. Former Army colonel Honasan won a seat in the Senate in 1995 in spite – or some would argue, because – of his past as a putschist; when his current term ends in 2013, he would have served in office for 15 years. Navy lieutenant Antonio Trillanes followed Honasan’s footsteps, becoming a senator in 2007 despite being incarcerated. In the 2010 elections, Army general Danilo Lim, Marines colonel Ariel Querubin, retired Army general Jovito Palparan, and former Air Force colonel Hector Tarrazona sought positions in the upper house, but none of them won a seat. At least 48 former soldiers and policemen ran for elective office in 2010, including Esperon and Ermita, who lost congressional races in Pangasinan and Batangas, respectively. Elective office, it would seem, is a perfectly natural post-retirement option for ex-officers. Yet despite the participation of these ex-officers in the electoral processes and their substantive representation in executive and legislative positions, things have remained dire for the AFP. Morales argues that success against insurgency should be the measure for judging the AFP. By that token, he says, the organization has completely failed. In an unpublished 2003 paper, Morales explained: “The AFP has failed to transform its resources into battlefield victory. It is an inefficient user of public resources. If this were otherwise then an increase in the Army’s budget must result in a reduction of rebel strength. The historical relationship between the Army budget and NPA guerilla strength shows that military operations have a minimal effect on the communist insurgency.” Political scientist Marcus Schulzke, in a paper published in 2010, said that the low level of professionalism in the Philippine military is responsible for the AFP’s poor response to the insurgency. “Security forces,” Schulzke wrote, “are often politicized and put into service of one faction of politicians working against others.” Schulzke traces the problem of politicization to the regime of Ferdinand Marcos, who fostered loyalty among troops by promoting favorites instead of the most talented. The EDSA revolt only served to worsen the situation. Observed Schulzke: “The ranks were already packed with officers used to acting based on personal ties. But the transition to democracy allowed them to feel a greater sense of influence over the political sphere.” In the 1991 book Filipino Politics: Development and Decay, David Wurfel noted that the system for the promotion of officers ranked colonel and above required presidential appointment and confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. “Nomination may have been based on the political judgment of professional peers,” wrote Wurfel, “but confirmation was strictly political.” Even worse, the culture of corruption has managed to isolate honest officers in the armed forces. Military insiders say that officers who refuse to participate in money-laundering activities are branded as not being team players, and are quickly sent off to less glamorous assignments. Morales says that personal ties and other extraneous factors, instead of merit, have become the military’s bases in selecting its leaders. “We don’t have a system for selecting who among the (officers) are fit to lead at the highest level,” he says. Schulzke argues that the development of an apolitical officer corps promoted through a meritocracy should become top priority in any discussion of AFP reforms. A meritocratic system, he wrote, “would discourage officers from becoming involved in politics, thus reducing the risk of corruption and allowing them to focus on restoring national security.” “By eliminating the politicized promotion system,” he continued, “officers would no longer have to worry about winning a popularity contest and would thus be free to make unpopular decisions like disciplining corrupt subordinates or waging a less glamorous, but more effective counterinsurgency focused on winning popular support.” For Morales, the first step in turning the military into an apolitical bureaucracy should come from the civilian government. He acknowledges that after EDSA, civilians have been intimidated by the military, whose threat of an uprising hangs like a Damocles’ sword for the government. This intimidation, he explains, has prevented people from making the AFP accountable. “They only selected, as chief of staff, who they thought could control the armed forces,” he says. “But there’s no oversight; no one’s looking into the living conditions of the soldiers, the state of preparedness of the air force and the navy, the state of training. There’s no civilian leader who goes to the camps and looks at the motor pools, the classrooms, the ammo dumps.” Morales says that as the people’s representatives, civilian government officials need to be more involved. He also proposes a return to basics to underscore civilian supremacy over the military, such as holding formal ceremonies for issuing arms to soldiers. An elective official would then present the gun to a soldier as a reminder of where the real authority lies. “Power comes from the people,” says Morales. “When a soldier finally wraps his hands around his weapon, he should be thinking, ‘This is not mine. This was only lent to me by the Filipino people so that I can defend them.’” – PCIJ, February 2011 |
For instance, the reports of the Commission on Audit (COA) on the AFP and the Department of National Defense (DND) from 2007 to 2009 alone speak of more tragic tales of corruption, with more real victims and bigger costs on the treasury. Among these:
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The AFP paid 184 “pensioners” aged 95 to 110 years old a total of P2.3 million in September 2009. This apparent case of ghost beneficiaries actually cost more, or P27.6 million, if the pension benefits were computed for the 12 months of 2009. The average lifespan in the Philippines as of March 2010 is 71.6 years for women, and 66.1 for men.
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Aside from these centenarians, a random audit in 2009 of pension payments totaling P243.2 million showed that the entire amount went to 18,051 pensioners and their heirs without birth dates, and 4,220 other pensioners without addresses indicated on the AFP master list of retired personnel.
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From 2007 to 2009, the AFP signed 22 “perfected contracts” for supplies (binoculars, squad automatic weapons, hand-held radio, basic trainer aircraft, light support watercraft, patrol killer medium, 76mm ammunition, explosive ordinance disposal bomb suit, etc.) under the AFP Modernization Program. As of December 2009, copies of these “perfected contracts” had yet to be submitted to the Office of the Auditor, the COA said.
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Nine supplies contracts worth a total of P1.96 billion funded under the AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund and awarded from 2003 to 2006 had been marked by delayed deliveries ranging from nine to 181 days. But as of December 2009, the COA said the AFP had not submitted the delivery receipts for seven of the nine contracts, and in all cases, had not shared information on contract amendments and extension of delivery dates.
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From 2002 to 2009, the DND had not collected or could not explain a total of P918.2 million in “accounts due from National Government Agencies,” including:
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Multimillion pesos for such items as “construction of PGMA SONA school buildings (DPWH)” that apparently refer to projects that then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had promised in her State of the Nation addresses and entrusted to the Department of Public Works and Highways to implement, using funds tucked in the DND budget.
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On Apr. 19, 2007, or three weeks to the May 2007 congressional and local elections, the DND released P549.7 million “to fund Foreign Military Sales P1-B under the RP-US Defense Assessment” that officers say need not be funded by the Philippine government at all.
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In the last three months of 2008, the DND made several multimillion-peso fund releases for such opaque reasons as “for intelligence reform projects,” P11.3 million; “to support program of expenditures,” P20 million; “to support program of expenditures,” P51.5 million; “reclassification of other prepaid expenses for procurement service account,” P5.9 million, among others.
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Cash advances worth P4.2 million for local and foreign trips made by officers and employees of the DND from 12 years ago remain unliquidated as of December 2009, including P1.5 million of the P3.6 million issued to then Secretary Gilberto Teodoro for three foreign travel schedules. Also listed with unliquidated cash advance of P346,490 is former Defense undersecretary Salvador Mison, and another P342,058, for a general reportedly in the running for the position of AFP chief of staff.
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Cash advances worth P7.06 million remain unliquidated as of December 2008 in the AFP, including over one million pesos each issued to three captains who are special disbursing officers from the military’s Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) funds, and about a total of P1.8 million issued to seven officers from the Personal Services (PS) fund that should pay for the salaries of soldiers.
These and other adverse findings that COA has enrolled in its reports on the AFP and DND paint a sorry picture of a military and defense establishment too cavalier or negligent in how it handles public funds. Or as retired Commodore Rex Robles puts it, some officers and men in the AFP take “a very casual attitude about money… they think every problem could be solved by simply throwing money at it.”
Big-ticket deals
To be sure, all Philippine presidents after the EDSA People Power Revolt of 1986 had failed to rein in the AFP as it entered into various big-ticket procurement deals that were marred by kickbacks, collusive or negotiated bidding, conflict of interest, or sheer inefficiency and waste.
The return of democracy after EDSA had also democratized access to military contracts and turned money-making into a free-for-all process in the AFP. This was in contrast to the nearly absolute control that strongman Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies wielded over public funds and state resources.
The Philippines’ post-1986 presidents not only tolerated the corruption in the AFP, but friends and associates of some of them are also said to have even pushed some big, questionable contracts onto the military.
Beginning 1986, vested political interests started cornering AFP projects particularly in the acquisition of aircraft, boats, munitions, vehicles, and communications equipment. Soldiers then talked about the purchase of S-211 trainer jets from Italy's Agusta company in the late 1980s by people close to then President Corazon "Cory" Aquino. After the delivery of 12 trainer jets, six more were ordered.
Together with two retired generals, Cory Aquino’s associates later formed a company that was the local partner of the firm British GKN for the supply of Simba armored vehicles. The company chose to be located at the former U.S. naval base in Subic after Fidel V. Ramos had already been elected president.
Under Ramos, a former chief of staff and defense secretary, the Armed Forces launched a Modernization Program in the mid-'90s with an initial budget forecast of P50 billion. It was not funded by Congress all at once, prompting a Ramos government proposal to support the program from the proceeds of the bases conversion contracts, along with the sale of Fort Bonifacio.
When Ramos bowed out of Malacanang in 1998, the government still had no money for the AFP Modernization Program. The billions of pesos raised from the sale of Fort Bonifacio are still not fully accounted for to this day.
‘Emergency’ purchases
Ramos’s immediate successor, Joseph "Erap" Estrada, stayed at the Palace from June 1998 to January 2001, or only 31 months. He set aside funds for the AFP Modernization Program. Yet, soldiers and officers say that under Estrada, the munitions and supplies used in the “all-out war” against the MILF became the biggest source of corruption.
In recent weeks at the Senate, former AFP budget officer George Rabusa testified that back then, the military purchased apparently overpriced munitions from Thailand without bidding. But since there was an emergency at the time in Mindanao, the military justified it as an “emergency purchase.”
The conflict in Mindanao and the intermittent offensives that the AFP mounts there have become the usual, useful handles of the AFP top brass to justify so-called “emergency” deals that need not be submitted to competitive bidding.
Crystal balls?
In April 2008, for instance, the supposed “emergency” triggered by the violence that followed talks on the proposed memorandum of agreement on the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) was invoked by Estrada’s successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, to justify the P1-billion “emergency” purchase of howitzer and mortar rounds.
Perhaps the generals had crystal balls. Hostilities in Mindanao would not break out anew until August 2008, or four months after the AFP top brass recommended the “emergency” purchase.
But that was not the end of it. The conflict had already subsided yet the contract had dragged on for two more years as a political and legal issue. Many officers had favored the Israeli company Talon to win the contract owing to its track record in delivering supplies on time. But accounts from military insiders indicate that another contractor with links to a retired general stopped Talon. The general, the insiders say, promised to award the deal to a company with connections to one of his former Philippine Military Academy (PMA) classmates.
The insiders say the general, who was later appointed Cabinet undersecretary, convinced then Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro to stop the deal; Talon went to court. When he succeeded Teodoro as defense chief, Norberto Gonzales gave the contract back to Talon to resolve the case. As of 2010, the howitzers and mortar rounds had yet to be delivered.
Stellar performer
In truth, it is Gloria Arroyo who emerges as the stellar performer among the four post-EDSA presidents on two counts: under her, the AFP clinched more sweetheart deals with contractors, and also got a parade of 12 chiefs of staff, a number given to sprucing up edifices in the camps.

Military officers say that under Arroyo – who spent a record nine years as the country’s chief executive and the military’s commander in chief – numerous big contracts worth billions of pesos were awarded, mostly without bidding, for, among others, the repair of Jacinto-class Corvettes, as well as the purchase of night-capable attack helicopters, smaller multi-purpose attack craft for the Navy, radio sets, Kevlar helmets, and even assault rifles.
In the Air Force, officers refer to Peter Rodriguez of Asian Aerospace Corp. as one of the most favored contractors because of his closeness to Arroyo and her husband, Jose Miguel "Mike" Arroyo, as well as to retired Gen. Eduardo Ermita, who had also served as Arroyo’s defense secretary and executive secretary.
By the accounts of many officers, Asian Aerospace had lent Arroyo its Learjets on several occasions for her travels in country, and sometimes overseas.
As Arroyo’s chief of staff starting July 2007, Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon Jr. also signed a supplemental contract worth nearly P800 million for the repair of three Jacinto-class patrol boats, which were former British Royal Navy boats stationed in Hong Kong and acquired before the territory’s handover to China in 1998. The signing happened days before he stepped down from his post in March 2008.
The thing was that even before Esperon came in as chief of staff, his predecessor had signed a P1-billion contract for the repair of the same boats. In other words, for the repair of three second-hand patrol boats, the military was now committed to two contracts worth a total of nearly P1.8 billion.
Esperon, one of the generals implicated in the “Hello, Garci” wiretapping scandal, was supposed to retire in February 2008 but Arroyo extended his tour of duty so he stepped down the next month.
Sweetheart deals
According to AFP sources, contractors eyeing sweetheart deals usually start the courtship by offering all-expense paid travels to officers assigned to do platform studies, sign contracts, and disburse funds. The same officers typically take more trips later, also expenses paid often by their hosts, during post-qualification tests or before a notice of award of contract is finally signed.
Hence, before even earning commissions from these contracts, overseas trips to the manufacturing yards or headquarters of these contractors have come to be expected by these officers as part of their “privileges.” Retired Commodore Robles says that many trips have meant staying abroad for weeks; sometimes, the more fortunate guests get to stay for one to three months abroad, all his expenses billed on the contractor.
In the pattern of some contractors from the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, South Korea’s government and some contractors from there have in recent years hosted some generals in Seoul. The Koreans have been angling for contracts ranging from the repair to supply of brand new and second-hand boats, trucks, and even the copper that the Philippine arsenal needs to manufacture bullets.
In the past, Seoul had given Manila old and obsolete F-5A/Bs and PKM (patrol killer medium) boats. These days, Korean-made KIA and Hyundai cars, and trucks often roll out of Army and Marines headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
It seems like Seoul now wants Manila to return the favor. Seoul has been eyeing supply contracts that would be funded under the AFP’s Capability Upgrade Program that was launched in 2003 by then Arroyo Defense Secretary Avelino Cruz. For a while as defense chief until June 30, 2010, Norberto Gonzales was also negotiating for a P5-billion Multi-Role Vessel for the Navy from Seoul. A seacraft similar to the Death Star mother ship in George Lucas’s epic “Star Wars” movies, the purchase would purportedly enhance the Navy's sealift capability.
10577 Northrop F-5A pole-mounted in the city at the Ekthesiako Kentro Lamias in Gennimata, Greece. (Credits at bottom of page)
Edifice complex
Aside from forging big-ticket contracts, though, a number of Arroyo’s chiefs of staff had also shown a propensity for building or refurbishing edifices and infrastructure facilities, at significant costs on the AFP’s budget.
The late Angelo Reyes, who led the military out of the barracks in the EDSA People Power 2 revolt of 2001, had the defense department painted and then spruced it up with first-class toilets. Reyes had served as Arroyo’s first chief of staff and later, first defense secretary, from 2001 to 2003.
The late chief of staff Arturo Enrile, meanwhile, built the AFP a theater cum museum. Soldiers later saw the rise of the “Great Wall of General Abu,” referring to the walls of Camp Aguinaldo that were repainted and rebuilt under then Chief of Staff Efren Abu, as well as the enormous canopy that rolled out under Chief of Staff Benjamin Defensor.
The officers interviewed by the PCIJ agree on one thing: some contractors themselves trigger fund conversions in the AFP just so they could sell their wares. Among the tactics of these suki contractors, they say, is to advance payment for still non-existent or to be negotiated contracts by covering the expenses of some generals on local and overseas travel.
More graft lairs
At the Senate, former Colonel Rabusa has so far identified three AFP staff units as the most prone to corruption: J2 (intelligence), J3 (operations), and J7 (civil-military operations).
Wittingly or unwittingly, he has skipped mention of what officers tell the PCIJ are also the virtual wallets of crooks from inside and outside the AFP and the Defense department: the AFP hospitals and medical services, the engineering brigades, and huge lump sums under the control of the most senior officers.
The latter includes items like office supplies expenses; food supplies expenses; travelling expenses (local and foreign); gasoline, oil and lubricants expenses; consultancy services; and several similarly opaque but separately funded items like representation expenses, confidential expenses, extraordinary expenses, and miscellaneous expenses.
These expense items – the easiest to snitch from and thus among the most abused by crooks – are the sources of what could be called bureaucratic graft in the AFP and DND, say some officers.
This is why the rank and file talk about how medicine bottles are filled or diluted with water at military hospitals. And while on paper, too much money has supposedly gone to buying hospital supplies and equipment, in practice these are often in short supply when soldiers are injured or fall ill.
Barter deals
Such an environment may thus help explain why some frontline troops have also taken to bartering their AFP-issued equipage for a quick buck.
At the lowest level, an ordinary corporal can sell his bullet to a sari-sari store in the remotest villages. Troops say that a soldier can exchange one live .45-caliber bullet or one round of an M-16 rifle for a bottle of GSM (Ginebra San Miguel) or two cans of sardines. With the blessing of the supply sergeant, a unit could sell sacks full of bullets to a local warlord or businessman or the unfriendly rebel units nearby, say some soldiers.
The records of the AFP abound with tell-tale signs of these barter-trade deals. To explain the loss of their guns and ammo, all that the traders have to do is file after-operation reports saying they have used up 100 rounds during one encounter with a band of rebels. The battle may even be invented, the number of bullets fired in a five-minute skirmish, bloated many times over. After all, whatever it is the troops say, fiction and all, would the generals at headquarters find out, or even care to find out?
Big, gray middle
Marines Col. Alexander Balutan, commander of the 1st Marine Brigade based in Cotabato, says that at core, it seems like corruption goes unchecked because of the gray areas in the AFP procurement and budget processes.
“Sabi ko sa mga PMA graduates, since I graduated in 1983, I see to it my gray area is very narrow,” Balutan told the PCIJ in a phone interview recently. “Kung very narrow ang gray area, you can easily discern black and white, right or left. You must maintain na klaro ‘yan or narrow.”
Corruption has unfolded, he conceded, because to some officers, the gray domain is a big, broad middle.
“There are officers after graduation who choose to make wrongs seem right, so the gray area becomes really wide,” said Balutan. “That’s when the decision becomes confused… Once a problem comes… they can no longer discern in a system that is unclear.”
He said the grayness of the situation has often been invoked to rationalize many crooked deals. “That’s the argument,” he said. “The gray area has become way too wide. If it’s very narrow, it would be easy to decide – there would be no room for argument, because you know it’s wrong.”
Being decisive about what is right and what is wrong is what troops in life-and-death situations at the frontlines deserve at the very least from higher officers, said Balutan.
“Because if you’re a soldier in battlefield, your decision needs to be exact because you’re talking about people’s lives,” he said. “You can’t say, wait a minute or that you’re not sure. That’s how (clear) it also should be in managing the AFP’s funds and resources.” – With reporting by Ed Lingao and Jaemark Tordecilla, PCIJ, February 2011
Photos: Corazon Aquino visits IRRI in 1986,
Some rights reserved by IRRI Images. | Gloria Macapagal Arroyo inauguration from Wikipilipinas.org | Camp Aguinaldo released under Public Domain to Wikipilipinas.org by the owner. | F-5A image
Some rights reserved by Jerry Gunner.
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