The Philippine Online Chronicles

An act of contempt against civilian authority.

This was how most observers described the scornful comments made by the commander of the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, and members of his staff against high officials of the Obama administration. To give you an idea how scornful the remarks were, they described National Security Adviser Jim Jones as “a clown.”

And if you consider the fact that it was already Strike Three for McChrystal (Strike One was when he forced the hand of the president by leaking his recommendations of increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan to the press while Strike Two was when he criticized Vice President Biden’s opposition to the surge in a speech in London), you just have to wonder if General Douglas MacArthur has in fact returned.

True enough, the imaginative media was quick to point out the similarities between McChrystal and MacArthur: In the midst of the Korean War, MacArthur met with Truman on Wake Island and was fired six moths later. In the midst of the War in Afghanistan McChyrstal met with Obama aboard Air Force One and; he was fired eight months later. Both generals had major disagreements with their commanders-in-chief over military strategies. Both generals made public their disagreements. Indeed, for many an observer, Obama’s firing of McChrystal was history repeating itself.

Except that there are glaring differences, of course.

Nonetheless, let us appreciate the comparison by trying to examine Douglas MacArthur, one of the most intriguing figures that I find most interesting in all of modern history. Incidentally, MacArthur played a lasting role in the histories of the two of my favorite countries (LOL), the Philippines and Japan.

From 1945 to 1951, MacArthur was Japan’s blue-eyed shogun who summoned the Emperor and made him renounce his divinity, dismantled the dangerous Kokutai ideology- a pseudo-political theory that mixes Shinto mysticism, militarism, imperialism and a bit of racism- and promulgated a constitution anchored on fundamental freedoms, human rights and democracy. But like the native shoguns who preceded him, he used the Emperor, who had moral responsibility for the war at best and was a war criminal at worst, and enlisted the collaboration of the bureaucratic and industrial elite only to create a Japanese state that, while built on strong foundations, is for all intents and purposes, and as demonstrated by the recent fall of the Hatoyama government, an American protectorate. In the Philippines, MacArthur was the first Field Marshall of the then non-existent Philippine Army. I had always found it amusing that the only person ever to be appointed Field Marshall of the Philippines was not a Filipino, until blogger-historian Manuel L Quezon III told me that MacArthur was actually made a Filipino citizen by legislative fiat. As Field Marshall, he failed to build a pliable Philippine Army and, mainly because of Washington’s Europe First Policy, he failed to defend Philippines against Imperial Japan in 1942. But he would later return against all odds to liberate the Islands from the invaders in 1945.

American Pompey

But while in Japan he was the benevolent and magnanimous victor who built instead of destroyed and in the Philippines the liberator who went to heaven in a golden chariot, for many Americans MacArthur was the demagogue who defied a duly-elected president and tried to become the Pompey of the American republic.

Early on, MacArthur was convinced he was destined for greatness. He was at the top of his class at West Point, imposed reforms as superintendent there, and was appointed the youngest ever Army Chief of Staff. As head of the army, MacArthur was not only extremely ambitious, but overly vain as well, almost to the point of being delusional. In 1932, when a World War I veterans asking for their benefits launched protest actions that almost paralyzed Washington in what is now known as the Bonus March, for example, he himself led an assault against the protesters’ pickets. When the media, who saw in the event a government ungrateful to its war veterans, questioned MacArthur over the incident, the general gloated, saying he had saved the nation from a “mob of insurrectionists.”

In the Philippines, not only did MacArthur receive the Field Marshall’s gold baton from President Manuel L. Quezon in what his then aide Dwight Eisenhower described as “a popmpous and rather ridiculous” ceremony in Malacanang; he also insisted on having a grand military parade of Philippine Army units around Manila “to boost public morale”, which Quezon rightly overruled for the reason that such luxury could not be carried out without sacrificing funds for more important things like recruitment and weapons acquisition.

“I just can’t understand how such a damn fool could have gotten to be a general,” wrote Eisenhower in his diary of the man who liked to parade in front of a large mirror admiring his profile while practicing oration.

This was also the man who would not mind leading young men to their unnecessary deaths as long as he could gain glory as a military leader. For example, when Washington’s military and civilian strategists were leaning towards a blockade and bombing of the main islands of Japan in light of the fact that the widespread and deadly military and civilian resistance in the Battle of Okinawa had made an invasion of the Japanese home islands very costly in both money and American lives, MacArthur adamantly insisted on his ambitious invasion plan that would have him hit the streets of Tokyo in a symbolic victory march. And when Truman ordered the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to put a quick end to the long war, MacArthur didn’t hide his disappointment.

Challenging Truman

But when Korea exploded, MacArthur was determined to get his victory march, this time against the “menace of Communism in the Far East.” Ignoring forecasts that crossing the Yalu River would invite not only Chinese counter-attack but a reaction from the Soviet Union which was treaty-bound to defend Red China, the general pursued the Chinese across the Yalu and was met by a large Chinese force that pushed his forces back in what was to become his most embarrassing military defeat after Bataan. Rather than owning up to his bungle, MacArthur called on “the unleashing” of the army of Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa so the Chinese would have to fight a front in the south while the UN forces cross the Chinese forces in order to defeat “once and for all” the so-called Communist menace. It was a perfect recipe for World War III but MacArthur couldn’t care less; he insisted that”in war, there’s no substitute for victory.”

But Truman had another idea. He had decided, rightly or wrongly, that the risk was not worth it. All he wanted was status quo ante, the restoration of South Korean sovereignty; anything beyond that, Truman thought, was not worth thousands of American lives. To this end, Truman embarked on a diplomatic effort to forge an armistice with the Communists. When MacArthur openly opposed this, he was fired.

This was of course similar to the McChrystal story. Like MacArthur, who wanted an all-out war as opposed to Truman’s limited war; McChrystal wanted a longer, if not endless, counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan as opposed to Obama’s vision of merely eliminating the Taliban and the threat of Al Qaeda and leaving Afghanistan to fend for itself afterwards. But the similarity ends there. For unlike McChrystal, MacArthur in all pomp and pageantry returned home to challenge the Truman administration in what was to become the worst crisis ever for the primacy of civilian authority over the military in the United States.

There are three factors that made MacArthur’s challenge a viable threat to the democratic institutions in the Unites States. First was his popularity as a war hero, which was enhanced by his imperious antics. Second was the on-going Communist hysteria in the United States. Indeed, even Hollywood at that time was penetrated by this hysteria and one of my favorite novelists Sydney Sheldon became one its earliest victims. Finally, there was an irresponsible Republican Party hell bent on regaining power after decades of Democratic rule.

Historian Walter Karp described the situation in the United States when MacArthur was fired as follows: “On the morning of April 11 only Western Union’s rules of propriety kept Congress from being deluged with furious obscenity. ‘Impeach the B who calls himself President,’ read one telegram typical of those pouring into Washington at an unprecedented rate—125,000 within forty-eight hours. ‘Impeach the little ward politician stupidity from Kansas City,’ read another, voicing the contempt millions now felt for the ‘plucky Harry’ of just a few years before. The letters and telegrams, the White House admitted, were running 20 to 1 against the President. So were the telephone calls that jangled in every newsroom and radio studio. In countless towns the President was hanged in effigy. Across the country flags flew at half-mast or upside down. Angry signs blossomed on houses: ‘To hell with the Reds and Harry Truman.’ ”

This situation was seized by the Republicans to discredit the Democrats, with people like Richard Nixon saying that the Reds are the happiest with MacArthur’s dismissal. They announced their plan to, first, launch an investigation into Truman’s war policies and, second, invite MacArthur to address a joint meeting of Congress. The Democrats in Congress, seeing the spectacular welcome the American people showered MacArthur upon his return, grudgingly acceded. For his part, Truman kept silent.

When MacArthur took the floor in Congress, millions tuned in to their radio sets to hear him speak. In his oration, he tried to establish his expertise of East Asian affairs by describing the prevailing political conditions in the region. He then claimed that under those conditions he couldn’t see how the United States could lose any war with the Communists. He called Truman’s limited war approach a policy of appeasement. Finally, to the delight of the Republicans, he claimed that his view was in fact shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which implied that Truman was misguided at best in his view of how the United States should prosecute the Korean War. MacArthur’s speech was melodramatic yet articulate and to say that it was very well-received was an understatement.

A congressman, for instance, exclaimed: “We have heard God speak today. God in the flesh, the voice of God” A former president, the one whom MacArthur was said to have disobeyed during the Bonus March incident, thought the general was “the reincarnation of St. Paul.” One observer said he had not felt his country’s democratic institutions threatened before that speech while another said that had the speech continued on, “we would have seen a march to the White House.”

Of course, Truman called it a “bunch of bullshit.”

But it did threaten his presidency in particular and civilian institutions in general. When MacArthur flew to New York after his Congressional speech, he was bestowed a heroes parade with hundreds of thousands of wild cheering fans, mile-long “Welcome Home” banners and tons of confetti. All these in a Democratic bailiwick. MacArthur received similar welcomes in other cities. The Republicans were beginning to say that the choice now was Truman or MacArthur. There seemed to be an answer when, a few days after MacArthur’s New York parade, Truman threw a ceremonial presidential baseball pitch amidst a thundering “boo” from the stadium’s crowds.

A series of media blitz from both camps of Truman and MacArthur soon ensued. In no time, the Republicans were organizing Congressional hearings on the Korean War. They wanted it televised, which the Democrats opposed but to no avail. They thought it would be the heaviest blow against Truman’s presidency, but as it turned out, the hearings marked the fall of MacArthur. Initially, MacArthur’s powerful testimony dealt more blows against the Truman administration. Once more, he claimed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military strategists share his opinion and that Truman’s appeasement would only embolden Red China and Russia and risk a more dangerous war in the future. However, when it was the Joint Chiefs and other military men’ turn to testify, far from affirming MacArthur’s claims, they questioned the wisdom of MacArthur’s tactics, put the Korean War into proper perspective and affirmed the need to dismiss MacArthur as Far Eastern commander because “his actions undermined the civilian authority over the military that is the hallmark of American democracy.” In effect, the military affirmed its fidelity to the democratic institutions and in the process put an end to the MacArthur-led hysteria.

And so, to the Republicans’ dismay, MacArthur was exposed as a dangerously ambitious general. His political standing began to decline. While upon his return from the Far East, it was almost certain MacArthur would be the next president of the United States, in 1951 all he got was an offer to be the running mate of candidate Robert Taft, but he lost the Republican nomination. While his address to the Congress was wildly cheered and applauded, his speech in the Republican convention was so poorly-received his voice was drowned by the audience’s chatters. His former aide, who happened to be his exact opposite as a general, Dwight Eisenhower, eventually won the presidency. I can only imagine how hard a blow that would have been to his bloated ego.

MacArthurism?

Republican stalwart Harold Ickes once warned that exalting MacArthur over Truman would be a dangerous precedence that could result in “a monstrosity” that people in the Philippines are very, very familiar with: an uncontrollable military. Indeed, had MacArthur been able to force Truman to bow to public pressure and adopt the general’s approach in the Korean War, it would have had led to a series of military officers forcing the hands of their presidents in times of war, thereby diluting the president’s constitutional role as commander-in-chief and undermining the doctrine of civilian supremacy over the military. It was a relief, therefore, that it was the military establishment itself that helped prevent the development of such monstrosity in the most powerful democratic nation on earth.

Nevertheless, there are those who say that MacArthur has left some sort of damage on the constitutional role of the president as commander-in-chief. Blogging for Slate, for instance, David Greenberg claims that Obama’s real problem is not McChrystal but “McArthurism.”

“The picture that took root—of a hotheaded, charismatic general with an angry and dedicated popular following—was worrisome, especially with the general positioned as the president’s political rival. Americans didn’t have to fear full-blown fascism to grasp that MacArthur’s grandstanding could erode Truman’s constitutional authority. While history came to look well on the president’s decision as brave and correct, the episode nonetheless left a lasting current of popular sentiment that in matters of war and peace, the military really knows best. At odds with the American tradition of the primacy of civilian rule, this attitude—call it MacArthurism—has continued sporadically to haunt American politics. More than McChrystal’s opinions on strategy, this disposition is what Obama now needs to address,” writes Greenberg.

All post-war presidents except General Eisenhower, Greenberg asserts, had to deal with MacArthurism. He gave as an example General Curtis LeMay’s imploring President John F. Kennedy to invade Cuba during the Missile Crisis (We all know how well Kennedy handled the situation) and President Lyndon B. Johnson to intensify bombings of North Vietnam. A more recent example, he said, was General Colin Powell’s successfully opposing President Bill Clinton’s liberal policy towards gays in military service. But for me, calling LeMay and Powell’s actions MacArthurism would be a bit of a stretch. This is because although these generals did try to undermine their presidents (it must be noted that only Powell succeeded, but only because Clinton did not hold his ground), they did not go to the extent of contemplating forcing their president’s hand into doing as they please. Strong disagreements with the commander-in-chief are normal; what matters is that when the commander-in-chief decides, the military follows.

In the case of McChrystal, conservative blogger Leslie H Gelb has an intersting analysis. He thinks their actions stems from the fact that, traditionally, the military “just doesn’t like the Democrats.” Noting that “the Rolling Stone article barely mentions policy differences over Afghanistan or anything else,” Gelb claims that “the bad feelings are mainly about values, style and constancy more than policy. The military feel the Democrats come at common problems from a different place and don’t stick to agreed plans when the going gets rough.”  While this might be a good explanation behind Powell’s “MacArthurism” against Clinton, I think this angle needs further substantiation. The assertion, for instance, that the military is by default anti-Democrats doesn’t make sense if you think of General Wesley Clark’s politics or of the fact that McChrystal actually voted for Obama in 2007.

At any rate, the idea that “in times of war or peace, the military really knows better,” is not only dangerous but flawed as well. There is wisdom behind the American founding father’s emphasis on civilian supremacy over the military in all aspect of governance. Veteran journalist Gil H.A. Santos, in an e-mail, articulated this by saying: “In real life, the scopes of parameters on which the civilian and the military work together are far different–the military has a narrow scope but the civilian has a wide one, although their objectives are the same: to win the war. 

“The military considers civilian deaths as ‘collateral  damage.’ That means it is part of the war and can not be avoided, sorry for that.  But the civilian has more number of factors to consider in plotting out the strategies, like geopolitics, economic trends and probable future policies that may affect the war, and multi-lateral international relations.”

In the twilight of his colorful life, MacArthur finally recognized this wisdom when, in his valedictory speech at West Point, he cautioned cadets not to meddle in the country’s political affairs. “These great national problems,” the general said, “are not for your professional or military solution.” With these words, he was able to redeem his place in his country’s history.

In the final analysis, the slightest sign of a military officer’s inability to recognize the wisdom behind the primacy of civilian authority in a democracy must be dealt with swiftly by every self-respecting president. It was therefore wise for Obama to have dismissed McChrystal from his post. True, McChrystal was a talented general; his counter-insurgency efforts did indeed pay off to a certain extent, but as Obama- and Truman before him- said, no individual is higher than the cause of war. And indeed of democratic institutions.

Besides, McChrystal was not indispensable. The very positive reaction of NATO and Afghan officials, who had initially opposed the sacking of McChrystal, to the appointment of General David Petraeus as his replacement is proof of this.