The Philippine Online Chronicles

What does "betrayal of public trust" mean?

This was the point of contention between the Senator-judges of the Impeachment Court and the prosecution team during the discussion on the matter of inaccuracies in Chief Justice Renato Corona’s Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net worth (SALN). In grilling Rep. Barganza on the issue of Chief Justice Corona’s inaccurate SALNs, Sen. Joker Arroyo concluded that even if the inaccuracies in SALN are intentional, it would only amount to perjury, which is not a high crime. Sen. Arroyo said, “It must be of a higher bar because we are dealing with a chief justice here.”

In response to this, House lead prosecutor Rep. Niel Tupas Jr. explained that the charge in Article II was “betrayal of public trust,” not acts falling under the phrase “other high crimes.” Citing the works of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a constitutionalist, Tupas reasoned that the term “betrayal of public trust” refers to acts and omissions that may not even be crimes at all. In a later media briefing, Rep. Juan Edgardo Angara stressed this distinction, saying , “The idea of public trust is connected with the oath of office of the public official, and if he violates the oath of office, then he has betrayed that trust.”

Lead defense counsel Atty. Serafin Cuevas inadvertently agreed, saying that “[the case of inaccuracies in Corona’s SALN] was not malicious and intentional and if the committee determines it to be so, there is no criminal and administrative liability." By implication, then, if there was intent to keep the SALN items incomplete and inaccurate, then criminal and administrative liability may arise. Art. XI, Sec. 2 of the1987 Philippine Constitution provides the possible grounds for impeachment as follows: "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." A reasonable reading of the text allows the conclusion that “other high crimes” is a catch-all phrase relative to the listed items preceding it, which are all serious crimes against the State or the public. By implication, “betrayal of public trust” is a separate class of actions.

Jurisprudence supports this reasoning. In Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives, Assoc. Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales referred to both “other high crimes” and “betrayal of public trust” as catch-all phrases, separate and distinct from one another: “Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.” If betrayal of public trust is separate and distinct from “other high crimes” punishable by impeachment, what kinds of acts, then, fall under betrayal of public trust?

In a case dealing with judicial plagiarism, Senior Assoc. Justice Antonio Carpio cited and excerpted the records of the Constitutional Commission to determine who actually has the power to define and review the definition of “betrayal of public trust,” and what the term was meant to convey. The full text cited is below:

(Volume II, Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 272) MR. REGALADO:Thank you, Madam President. xxx First, this is with respect to Section 2, on the grounds for impeachment, and I quote: “… culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, graft and corruption or betrayal of public trust.” Just for the record, what would the Committee envision as a betrayal of the public trust which is not otherwise covered by the other terms antecedent thereto?

MR. ROMULO: I think, if I may speak for the Committee and subject to further comments of Commissioner de los Reyes, the concept is that this is a catchall phrase. Really, it refers to his oath of office, in the end that the idea of a public trust is connected with the oath of office of the officer, and if he violates that oath of office, then he has betrayed that trust.

MR. REGALADO: Thank you.

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, may I ask Commissioner de los Reyes to perhaps add to those remarks.

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner de los Reyes is recognized.

MR. DE LOS REYES: The reason I proposed this amendment is that during the Regular Batasang Pambansa when there was a move to impeach then President Marcos, there were arguments to the effect that there is no ground for impeachment because there is no proof that President Marcos committed criminal acts which are punishable, or considered penal offenses. And so the term "betrayal of public trust," as explained by Commissioner Romulo, is a catchall phrase to include all acts which are not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office. It includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of public interest and which tend to bring the office into disrepute. That is the purpose, Madam President. Thank you.

MR. ROMULO: If I may add another example, because Commissioner Regalado asked a very good question. This concept would include, I think, obstruction of justice since in his oath he swears to do justice to every man; so if he does anything that obstructs justice, it could be construed as a betrayal of the public trust. Thank you.

The key concept here, then, is that acts falling under “betrayal of public trust” are such acts that are “to the prejudice of public interest and which tend to bring the office into disrepute,” as Commissioner De los Reyes explained. Considering Commissioner Romulo’s input, even crimes not necessarily deemed a “high crime,” such as obstruction of justice, can also fall under “betrayal of public trust,” for as long as it meets that threshold of prejudicing public interest and bringing the office to disrepute.

This writer finds its puzzling, then, that Sen. Arroyo seems to be using an entirely different framework for assessing and evaluating the Articles of Impeachment, and the threshold for determining if a charge is indeed an impeachable offense. It also brings up a concern over whether or not the other Senator-jurors appreciate and understand this nuance.

All 8 Articles of Impeachment accuse Chief Justice Corona of betrayal of public trust in one form or another. It would be a great shame, indeed a betrayal most foul, if Chief Justice Corona was acquitted of these charges based on an understanding of “betrayal of public trust” totally different from what was envisioned by the framers of our Constitution.

Juan G. M. Ragragio is a thirtysomething year-old nerd/geek hybrid who blogs at http://raggster.wordpress.com and tweets at https://twitter.com/raggster. When not online, he either attends law school at the University of the Philippines College of Law or stays home inventing new ways to use chicken noodle soup.

Photo from the Philippine Senate website. Some rights reserved.